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They Can’t Take that Away from Me:  An Indemnification 




Artist Cady Noland rose to prominence during the art market boom of the 1980s 
with mixed-media installations that employed found imagery to comment on the 
darker side of American social identity.1  Her work has garnered the highest price 
ever paid at auction for the work of a living female artist.2   Despite critical and 
commercial success, Noland has expressed deep concern over what she considers the 
improper handling and presentation of her art by collectors, auction houses, and 
museums.  She has likened the auction process to “cutting up a writer’s words and 
throwing them up in the air,” further stating, “[i]f I had known that everything would 
be flipping at auction, I would have made works that were impervious.”3 
Noland’s idiosyncratic behavior likely would have remained art world gossip had 
she not become embroiled in several highly publicized lawsuits.  Noland stopped 
creating new works altogether in 2001 and refuses to facilitate any exhibitions 
devoted to her career.  For nearly two decades, she has spent her time monitoring 
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Oct. 24, 2017); Sonya G. Bonneau, Honor and Destruction: The Conflicted Object in Moral Rights Law, 
87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 47, 59 (2013). 
 2. Rain Embuscado, The Most Expensive Living Female Artists in 2016, ARTNET (Apr. 8, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/V38E-LSV7; Eileen Kinsella, Who Are the Most Expensive Living Female Artists?, 
ARTNET (Jan. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/W57K-3CWZ. 
 3. SARAH THORTON, 33 ARTISTS IN 3 ACTS 326–27 (2014). 
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older works and recently appeared to have discovered a method that may halt 
continued resales.4  In 2012, Noland began renouncing authorship of works that she 
is known to have created but which have allegedly deteriorated to the point that she 
no longer approves of them as “her art,” resulting in multiple legal actions.5  Because 
an artist’s acknowledgement rather than her hand typically defines whether a work 
is considered “original,”6 Noland’s disavowals have the potential to render her art 
unsaleable, inflicting financial harm upon the collectors who currently own the 
pieces.7  Who should absorb this sudden loss in value? 
This Note argues that market participants should be indemnified against legally 
baseless revocations of attribution by living artists.  Noland justifies her disavowals 
under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), the American answer to the 
French concept of droit moral or moral rights.8  Moral rights provide artists with 
control over the integrity and attribution of their art even after it has been sold.  In a 
narrow set of circumstances, VARA permits a living artist to disavow her works if 
they have been modified so extensively as to be prejudicial to the artist’s reputation 
(excepting changes caused by aging or conservation).9  But there is a dearth of case 
law defining terms like modification, prejudice, and reputation.  Even among 
Noland’s disavowals there is variation:  she revoked authorship of the aluminum 
print Cowboys Milking because she perceived wear on its corners, and of the wooden 
building façade Log Cabin because conservators allegedly rebuilt the entire piece 
without permission.10 
Noland is one of relatively few artists to bring lawsuits under VARA, and research 
for this Note has uncovered no cases of an owner or other stakeholder suing an artist 
for improperly invoking VARA.  Even if a party were to sue Noland for abusing 
VARA and successfully obtain an injunction forcing her to legally affirm authorship 
of a work, this would likely not remedy the market damage caused by her public 
disavowal.  No matter the conclusion of a court, collectors are unlikely to invest 
millions of dollars in art unsupported by its creator.  Unfortunately, moral rights law 
in the United States has not yet addressed this situation.  This Note proposes that the 
indemnification solutions contained in the droit moral provide a possible solution to 
the problems that result when an artist disavows her art without legal cause. 
 
 4. Id., at 327–28. 
 5. Marc Jancou Fine Art v. Sotheby’s Inc., No. 650316-2012, 2012 WL 7964120 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Nov. 13, 2012); Mueller v. Michael Janssen Gallery Pte. Ltd., 225 F. Supp. 3d 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Noland v. Galerie Michael Janssen, No. 1:17-CV-05452 (S.D.N.Y. 
complaint filed July 18, 2017). 
 6. See, e.g., Mia Fineman, Looks Brilliant on Paper. But Who, Exactly, Is Going to Make It?, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 7, 2006), https://nyti.ms/2kekBmv (“‘We’re in a post-Conceptual era where it’s really the 
artist’s idea and vision that are prized, rather than the ability to master the crafts that support the work,’ 
said Jeffrey Deitch, whose SoHo gallery specializes in large-scale productions by contemporary artists.”). 
 7. Jancou, No. 650316-2012; Mueller, 225 F. Supp. 3d 201. 
 8. 17 U.S.C. § 106A; Jancou, No. 650316-2012 at 7; Noland, No. 1:17-CV-05452 at 6; see also 
Pierre Sirinelli, Intellectual Property Law, in INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 171–204, 180–85 (George 
A. Bermann & Etienne Picard eds., 2012) (providing an overview of droit moral). 
 9. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)–(c)(2). 
 10. See Jancou, No. 650316-2012; Noland, No. 1:17-CV-05452. 
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I. MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Moral rights are not included in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, which 
aims to financially incentivize creators to produce by preventing others from 
capitalizing on the creator’s work.11   Andy Author might be discouraged from 
writing The Great Novel if Roger Reproduction can make and sell copies without 
paying Andy.  But can law prevent Edward Editor from editing and publishing the 
Novel in a way that contradicts Andy’s wishes even if Andy is economically 
compensated?  Such “moral” rights of the author are treated differently around the 
world.12 
Historically, there have been two philosophical camps when it comes to protecting 
literary and artistic works.13  The Common Law tradition, developed in England and 
adopted by the United States, focuses on the utilitarian benefits of copyright, while 
the Continental tradition (represented in this Note by France) seeks to ensure that a 
creator maintains some control over her work even after relinquishing chattel or 
economic rights.  Although international norms have merged these two intellectual 
histories and forced the U.S. to expand the noneconomic rights afforded to authors 
by its laws, those laws still provide fewer protections than their European 
equivalents.14 
A. ORIGINS  
Copyright law originated in the literary arts.  With the introduction of the printing 
press to England in the fifteenth century, the monarchy soon realized the economic 
and political potential of controlling the burgeoning publishing industry.  By 1710, 
England passed the first known copyright act, The Statute of Anne, upon which the 
U.S. modelled its earliest copyright legislation eighty years later.  Like its British 
forbearer, the Copyright Act of 1790 protected the economic rights of publishers and 
authors by requiring formal registration of works in return for renewable copyright 
protection against unauthorized reproductions.15  This utilitarian law was closely 
linked to the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, which empowers Congress “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”16 
 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
 12. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, 
AND PRACTICE 14 (3rd ed. 2013). 
 13. Id. at 358. 
 14. Id. at 14.  Language still evidences these distinct philosophies.  For example, the French 
“translation” of copyright is not a translation at all:  the equivalent term is droit d’auteur (“author’s right”).  
Sirinelli, supra note 8, at 172, 180.  See also Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: 
A Comparison of Artists’ Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 
3 (1980) (“The French droit d’auteur is a concept far broader than American copyright, in fact French 
scholars dispute whether it can really be called a property right at all.”). 
 15. GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 12, at 15–17. 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2; see also GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 12, at 17. 
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Like the U.S., France passed early copyright legislation in the late eighteenth 
century to prevent unauthorized reproduction of creative works.17  As a Civil Law 
nation, France does not traditionally rely on precedent to form legal doctrines.  The 
droit moral, however, developed through case law in the wake of the French 
Revolution.18  The droit moral (a term first used in 1878, from which “moral rights” 
is derived) encompasses a group of rights associated with authorial personality.19  
Contrary to the economic focus of Anglo intellectual property law, this Continental 
tradition is rooted in the notion that the fruits of one’s labor establish an inalienable 
authorial personality distinct from a physical object.20  This is not to suggest that 
France did not have traditional economic protections, but rather that, “[i]n the view 
of French jurists, moral rights are not trifling interests which merely are appended to 
the law of copyright.”21  It is a small wonder, then, that France was the primary 
proponent of the first “universal” authors’ rights agreement:  The Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886 (“Berne” or “the 
Convention”).22  
B. DEVELOPMENT 
Although Berne was initially signed by ten countries, spanning much of Europe 
and its colonies, the U.S. was conspicuously absent for over a century.  As of the 
Convention’s initial signing in the late nineteenth century, the U.S. had not entered 
many international agreements regarding copyright.  Moreover, amendments to 
Berne prohibiting copyright formalities and requiring minimum moral rights may 
have made the Convention less and less appealing to the American utilitarian ethos.23  
The practical benefit of having uniform minimum protections for intellectual 
property in a globalizing world eventually drove the U.S. to join Berne in 1988 
through the Berne Convention Implementation Act (“BCIA”). 24   Joining Berne 
 
 17. DaSilva, supra note 14, at 9; GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 12, at 19. 
 18. DaSilva, supra note 14, at 9; see generally The Common Law and Civil Traditions, THE 
ROBBINS COLLECTION (2010), available at https://perma.cc/7CXP-5RLN (explaining that that common 
law is predominantly based on precedent, while civil law nations have codified legal codes). 
 19. MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS, 419 (5th ed. 2007); Sirinelli, supra 
note 8, at 180. 
 20. See Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 7–8 
(1997); Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A Comparison of Droit 
Moral Between France and the United States, 2 COLUM. VLA J.L. & ARTS 361 (1998). 
 21. DaSilva, supra note 14, at 4. 
 22. GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 12, at 33–34; Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(2), Sept. 28, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 [hereinafter Berne].  This 
is the current version of the act including previous revisions and amendments. 
 23. GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 12, at 36–38; Berne, art. 5(2) (“The enjoyment and 
the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality”); Berne, art. 6bis (“to claim authorship; 
to object to certain modifications and other derogatory actions”). 
 24. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) 
[hereinafter BCIA]; see JULIE E. COHEN, ET. AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 34 
(3d ed. 2010), cited in Samuel Jacobs, Note, The Effect of the 1886 Berne Convention on the U.S. 
Copyright System’s Treatment of Moral Rights and Copyright Term, and Where at Leaves Us Today, 23 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 169, 171–74 (2016). 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improved legal uniformity in a globalizing world.  But the U.S. specifically did not 
implement new moral rights: 
The provisions of the Berne Convention, the adherence of the United States thereto, and 
satisfaction of United States Obligations thereunder, do not expand or reduce any right 
of an author of a work, whether claimed under Federal, State, or the common law—(1) 
to claim authorship of the work; or (2) to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the work, that would prejudice 
the author’s honor or reputation.25 
Congress paradoxically argued that existing law sufficiently protected the non-
economic rights of creators, even though moral rights requirements historically 
prevented the U.S. from joining Berne.26 
Moreover, there was clearly a dearth of moral rights protection afforded to artists 
in the U.S.  In 1934, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. destroyed a mural that his family had 
commissioned Diego Rivera to paint because of its explicitly communist imagery.  
At the time, Rivera had no legal recourse, but predicted that there would be “a justice 
that prevents assassination of human character.”27  In 1947, the Seventh Circuit held 
that an artist had no implied right to credit when independently contracted to create 
magazine illustrations.  The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the presence of moral 
rights in “certain foreign countries,” but stated that it was “not disposed to make any 
new law in this respect.” 28   By 1976, “[t]he moral right of the artist, still 
comparatively young even in the nation of its origin, [had] not reached anything like 
its full development” in the U.S.29  The Second Circuit in Gilliam v. ABC, a case 
involving unauthorized editing of Monty Python films for television, resorted to 
using trademark law to find for the plaintiffs.30  Nevertheless, the court asserted that 
trademark law “is not a substitute for droit moral which authors in Europe enjoy,” 
and “copyright law should be used to recognize the important role of the artist in our 
society and the need to encourage production and dissemination of artistic works by 
providing adequate legal protection for one who submits his work to the public.”31  
Given this history, it is surprising that Congress consciously delayed “thorough and 
 
 25. BCIA § 3(b); see Jacobs, supra note 24, 171–74 (2016).  
 26. BCIA § 2(3) (“The amendments made by this Act, together with the law as it exists on the date 
of enactment of this Act, satisfy the obligations of the United States in adhering to the Berne Convention 
and no further rights or interests shall be recognized or created for that purpose.”); see also Jacobs, supra 
note 24, at 174. 
 27. See Natalia Thurston, Buyer Beware: The Unexpected Consequences of the Visual Artists 
Rights Act, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 701 (2005).  Thurston argues that under VARA, Rivera would 
have—at the very least—been entitled to notice by the Rockefellers so that he could remove the mural 
before it was destroyed.  At most, Rivera would have been entitled to injunctive relief and damages 
because the Rockefellers were threatening to destroy the integrity of his mural (a work of “recognized 
stature”), an act that could affect his artistic reputation and legacy.  Id. at 702.  See also Crimi v. Rutgers 
Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (holding an artist had no recourse when the church 
for which he painted a fresco decided to paint over it). 
 28. See Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947). 
 29. Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1026 (1976) 
[hereinafter Refrigerator of Buffet]. 
 30. Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 31. Id. 
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comprehensive” study of the moral rights issue until 1989, when a version of VARA 
was first proposed.32 
One compelling explanation for the growing interest in moral rights and passage 
of VARA in 1990 was the expansion of the art market during the prior decade, when 
prices skyrocketed and artists became celebrities.  The benefits of this boom, 
however, applied only to a small percentage of working artists, and many were left 
unprotected. 33   In proposing the bill, Senator Kennedy cited the lofty goal of 
“protect[ing] the fundamental freedom of expression” essential to artists like 
Michelangelo.34  A prescient statement from an art dealer at the time, however, took 
the view that “the right of an artist to disclaim authorship of a work of art whether or 
not he created it is extremely dangerous,” and went on to cite the difficulties that 
occur when an artist “does not remember or wish to remember his/her own work.”35  
This was the same period in which Cady Noland came onto the scene, and her actions 
continue to address the tension between the moral rights of artists and economic 
realities of the market. 
C. VARA 
Experience tells us that philosophical ideals regarding art inevitably clash with 
legal and commercial realities, and VARA is by no means a comprehensive system 
for protecting artists or resolving philosophical disputes about authorship.  
Nevertheless, for a very limited set of artists, VARA provides the rights of attribution 
and integrity articulated in Berne.  While Berne requires that moral rights protect 
“every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the 
mode or form of its expression,” VARA protects only visual artists who create unique 
or limited edition paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and photographs.36  Some 
scholars have questioned whether such limited protection renders VARA 
meaningless or even inhibits the creation of new works that copyright law should 
encourage.37   Others have commented on what they perceive to be the lack of 
justification for privileging certain types of art in this manner.38  Moral rights in the 
 
 32. Copyright Moral Rights: Visual Rights Act (S. 1198) And Moral Rights in Other Still Visual Art 
Forms: Hearing on S. 1198 Before the S. Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, 101st Cong. 
1 (1989) (statement of Hon. Dennis DeConcini, Sen. from Ariz.). 
 33. Bonneau, supra note 1, at 60. 
 34. Copyright Moral Rights: Visual Rights Act (S. 1198) And Moral Rights in Other Still Visual Art 
Forms: Hearing on S. 1198 Before the S. Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, 101st Cong. 
17 (1989) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy of Mass.). 
 35. Copyright Moral Rights: Visual Rights Act (S. 1198) And Moral Rights in Other Still Visual Art 
Forms: Hearing on S. 1198 Before the S. Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, 101st Cong. 
21 (1989) (statement of art dealer Gerald G. Stiebel, President of Rosenberg and Stiebel). 
 36. Berne, art. 2(1); 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)–(2).  U.S. courts have declined to broaden the 
VARA’s’ scope to other media.  See, e.g., Lilley v. Stout, 384 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2005) (declining to 
extend to preparatory photographs and paintings); Cheffins v. Stewart,  No. 12-16913 (9th Cir. June 8, 
2016) (declining to extend to applied or utilitarian art); Pollara v. Seymour, 150 F. Supp. 2d 393 (N.D.N.Y 
2001) (declining to extend to art made for promotional or advertising purposes). 
 37. See Thurston, supra note 27, at 713; see also Amy Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. 
REV. 263, 265 (2009).  
 38. Bonneau, supra note 1, at 48. 
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U.S. are also waivable, creating market pressures that might actually harm artists; as 
one scholar has opined, “[purchasers] may negotiate prices downward if artists seek 
to assert their moral rights.  This could lead to artists automatically waiving their 
moral rights, thereby creating inefficient transactions.”39  Moreover, the ability to 
waive moral rights defeats the purpose of having laws inherently tied to the authorial 
personality of the artist.  
1. The Integrity Right  
VARA allows visual artists to enjoin:  (1) the intentional modification of works, 
if such modification would be prejudicial to the artists’ reputations; or (2) the 
destruction of works of “recognized stature.” 40   This right does not apply to 
modifications that are the result of aging or non-negligent conservation.41  In the 
quarter-century since VARA was enacted, most plaintiffs who have brought claims 
under VARA have sought damages or injunctions for violations of this integrity 
right.42  
The integrity case most relevant to the Noland disputes is Flack v. Friends of 
Queen Catherine.43  In Flack, the well-known American artist Audrey Flack was 
commissioned to create a sculpture of Queen Catherine of England to be placed on 
public land in New York.44  This work was sponsored by the non-profit Friends of 
Queen Catherine (“FQC”).  After Flack created a full-sized clay version of the statue 
to be cast in bronze, there was controversy over its subject’s connection to the slave 
trade.  As a result, FQC lost its permission to place the sculpture in the originally 
planned site.  FQC and associated defendants nevertheless agreed to cast the 
sculpture.  But by the time they came to this agreement, the head of the clay maquette 
had been damaged.  FQC declined Flack’s offer to resculpt the head for a fee and 
instead hired one of her assistants to complete the work, which he allegedly did quite 
poorly.  Flack sued FQC in the Southern District of New York under VARA to 
prevent further modification or destruction of her work.  Although the court held the 
assistant’s work to be conservation under VARA, it also held that the hiring of an 
 
 39. Thurston, supra note 24, at 715–17. 
 40. § 106A(a)(3)(B).  See, e.g., Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (artist’s 
VARA claim was dismissed because, although she had received some local attention, the court concluded 
her limited stature did not afford protection to every work she created). 
 41. § 106A(c)(1)–(2). 
 42. See, e.g., Bd. of Managers of Soho Int’l Arts Condo. v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 
1226, 2003 WL 21403333 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 17, 2003); Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 988 F.Supp.2d 212 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013).  Both involve artists suing building owners or managers for damage to art incorporated 
into a structure. 
 43. 139 F. Supp. 2d 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 44. The New York borough of Queens is named for the seventeenth century Queen of England, 
Catherine (also known as Catherine of Aragon).  See generally Nadine Brozan, Here’s to Queen 
Catherine, Who Gave Queens a Name, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1990, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/11/nyregion/here-s-to-queen-catherine-who-gave-queens-a-
name.html. 
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incompetent conservator could constitute gross negligence.  The case eventually 
settled out of court.45 
2. The Attribution Right 
The second prong of VARA, the right of attribution, allows an artist to:  (1) require 
that her name be displayed alongside works she created; and (2) disclaim authorship 
of works she (a) did not create or (b) created, but which have been modified to such 
an extent that the modification prejudices the artist’s reputation.46  There are two 
important exceptions to the right of attribution.  First, modification resulting from 
the “passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials” does not constitute a 
modification that can support a disavowal.  Second, unless gross negligence is found 
(as alluded to in Flack), a work cannot be disavowed for modifications made in the 
course of conservation or public presentation. 47   In practice, most art market 
participants would rather work with an artist extralegally than incur her disapproval.  
In the same auction from which Cowboys Milking was withdrawn, another Noland 
piece called Ooozewald was auctioned with the following disclaimer: 
Please note the stand with which the lot is being displayed is not the stand that Cady 
Noland designed for this work and this stand is not included in the sale of this lot.  As 
a result, subsequent to the sale, the buyer will be provided with a new stand, which will 
be in accordance with Ms. Noland’s copyrighted stand design for this lot, and which 
will be an integral part of the complete work.48 
The work still sold for over six and a half million dollars.49 
To help illustrate how the right of attribution under VARA could be employed by 
a party in a more traditional medium, consider the following hypothetical scenario 
of Polly Painter.  Polly is just beginning her career and sells a still life depicting a 
vase of flowers on a table to Coco Collector.  Coco wants to put the painting in a new 
frame, but the painting is one foot too long.  Unbeknownst to Polly, Coco cuts off 
twelve inches from the bottom of the canvas.50  The framed painting now depicts 
only a vase of flowers, because the bottom portion that included the table was 
removed by Coco.  Ten years later, Polly has become famous for her still life 
paintings, especially those with vases of flowers on tables.  Coco thinks that she can 
make a profit and attempts to resell the Polly Painter work as an original.  Legally, 
Polly may object to this attribution and argue that the work is not a “Polly Painter” 
 
 45. Flack, 139 F. Supp. 2d 526; see Thomas & Charles Danziger, Restoration Drama, 
ART+AUCTION, Apr. 1, 2009.  
 46. § 106A(a)(1)–(2).  Recently in the Seventh Circuit, Peter Doig was forced to prove in court that 
he did not paint a canvas for which he denied authorship.  See Doig Memorandum of Law in Support of 
His Motion for Summary Judgment, Dec. 11, 2015, ECF No. 160-1. 
 47. § 106A(c)(1)–(2). 
 48. Oozewald, SOTHEBY’S, available at https://perma.cc/SD8R-AYCV (last visited Oct. 24, 2017). 
 49. Id.   
 50. This scenario is more common than one might imagine. Toulouse-Lautrec, Rembrandt, and 
Picasso paintings have been cut up to fit in frames or so that the pieces could be sold separately for more 
money.  See MERRYMAN, supra note 19, at 439. 
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original because Coco intentionally modified the canvas so that it no longer reflects 
Polly’s artistic vision—a vase of flowers on a table.  Moreover, as Polly is now 
known for her depictions of vases on tables, selling this “early work” without the 
table might create misunderstandings about the trajectory of Polly’s career and 
prejudice her artistic reputation.  Coco still owns what remains of the physical canvas 
and may sell the work, but not as a “Polly Painter.”  Although a potential buyer might 
still want to purchase the canvas, the work would probably not garner a price 
comparable to that of an original Polly Painter.  This hypothetical illustrates a 
situation where VARA’s right of attribution, if properly employed, would be useful 
to an artist. 
Consider an alternative fact pattern in which Polly’s invocation of VARA is 
arguably improper.  Polly Painter is still just beginning her career and gifts her dear 
friend Coco Collector a still life.  Coco cherishes the painting and keeps it just as it 
was originally conceived.  Ten years later, Polly has become famous, but she and 
Coco have had a falling out.  No longer sentimentally attached to the canvas, Coco 
decides to auction it and make a profit.  But Polly tells the auction house she did not 
paint the still life and invokes her right under VARA to dissociate her name from the 
canvas for sale.  As a result, the auction house refuses to sell the work, and Coco is 
stuck with an unmarketable painting by a former friend.  Coco seeks counsel to 
advise whether she may sue Polly and argue that Polly wrongly invoked VARA and 
thus deprived her of the value of her property.51  Unfortunately for Coco, there is no 
U.S. case law on the subject. 
This hole in the law creates a gray area where artists’ actions may cost collectors, 
galleries, and auction houses a substantial amount of money.  Moral rights law in the 
U.S. has not adequately developed to provide a predictable resolution to what we 
might call the “Noland Problem”—i.e., the dilemma posed by an artist’s arguably 
improper invocation of VARA depriving other market participants of the value of 
her art.  From a purely legal perspective, VARA cases are fact specific:  the qualities 
of the medium employed, history of conservation, and artistic reputation are elements 
that can be and have been interpreted in a court setting when artists have brought 
their own suits seeking validation of a moral rights claim.  A collector should 
likewise be able to ask a court to make a legal determination of authorship to prove 
whether an artist’s claim falls outside the scope of VARA.  What VARA does not 
account for is the effect on the market; even if an artist is legally established as author 
of a work, that does not ensure a collector can recoup the value of a work if that value 
has been lessened by the artist’s public statements.  The French droit moral comes 
closer to anticipating such a scenario and may hold a solution for dealing with such 
cases. 
 
 51. This fact pattern is based on a real incident that occurred with Lucien Freud in the United 
Kingdom (and thus does not fall under VARA), which did not result in litigation.  See generally Kate 
Lyons, BBC Says Painting is by Lucien Freud Despite His Denials, GUARDIAN (Jul. 17, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/X68D-CZNQ. 
MARBER, AN INDEMNIFICATION SOLUTION TO UNMERITED VARA CLAIMS, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 319 (2018) 
328 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [41:2 
II. MORAL RIGHTS IN FRANCE 
Like their United States counterparts, French courts do not appear to have 
considered a case where an artist is sued for improperly revoking attribution of their 
own work.  But French moral rights law in general seems to favor an indemnification 
approach to conflicts between the economic rights of collectors and the authorial 
rights of the artist. 
To examine the French regime, an analysis of the differences between VARA and 
the droit moral is helpful.  France employs a dualist system in which the collective 
rights of authors (droits d’auteur) are divided into equally weighted patrimonial 
(economic) and moral rights.52  Where VARA applies to a narrow range of visual 
art, the droit moral applies to all creative works, even in mediums not yet anticipated 
by a legislature, and includes works-for-hire.53  In contrast to the American focus on 
unique fine art objects, the Continental tradition centers on the artist and does not 
privilege any medium.  Moral rights in France are generally perpetual, inalienable, 
and may be transferred causa mortis to heirs. 54   In the U.S., moral rights are 
imprescriptible, yet tied to the life of the author and waivable by a signed, written 
instrument.55 
The multiplicity of rights encompassed in the French Intellectual Property Code 
are of crucial significance to this Note.  While VARA covers attribution and integrity, 
the droit moral is composed of four distinct rights contained within various 
provisions of the French Intellectual Property Code:  (1) divulgation (publication or 
disclosure); (2) paternité (attribution); (3) respect de l’oeuvre (integrity); and (4) 
retrait ou repentir (withdrawal).56  These four rights follow art from its creation, 
when it is within the artist’s physical control, to the period after sale or transfer. 
A. DROIT DE DIVULGATION57 
In France, the artist alone holds the right to decide whether, when, and how her 
work is made public.  This is distinct from the right of withdrawal, discussed infra, 
which applies after an artist has already alienated the chattel embodying the work.  
 
 52. Sirinelli, supra note 8, at 180. 
 53. Code de la propriété intellectuelle [hereinafter CIP] art. L112-1 (Fr.) (“The provisions of this 
Code shall protect the rights of authors in all works of the mind, whatever their kind, form of expression, 
merit or purpose”); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A work of visual art does not include—(B) any work made for 
hire”).  See also Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d 71 F.3d 77 (2d 
Cir. 1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996) (declining to apply VARA to works-for-hire).  CIP art. 
L111-1 (“the existence or conclusion of a contract for hire or of service by the author of a work of the 
mind shall in no way derogate from the enjoyment of the right afforded…”). 
 54. CIP art. L121-1. 
 55. § 106A (d)1; (e)(1). 
 56. Sirinelli, supra note 8, at 180; CIP. 
 57. CIP L121-2 (“The author alone shall have the right to divulge his work”); Sirinelli, supra note 
8, at 180.  There is no equivalent provision to le droit de divulgation in VARA, but U.S. courts have 
arguably employed its philosophy by, for example, restricting even the “fair use” of unpublished 
manuscripts for news reporting.  Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 
Authorship, 1991 Duke L. J. 455, 499, n. 176 (1991) (citing, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1986); Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
MARBER, AN INDEMNIFICATION SOLUTION TO UNMERITED VARA CLAIMS, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 319 (2018) 
2018] AN INDEMNIFICATION SOLUTION TO UNMERITED VARA CLAIMS 329 
This principle was famously illustrated in an 1898 case involving American painter 
James McNeill Whistler, who was living in France at the time.  The French court 
held Whistler was not compelled to turn over a portrait with which he was 
unsatisfied, but was required to pay his patron damages.58  Whistler represents an 
important theme throughout French moral rights law:  artists are given broad freedom 
regarding their work, but are often required to indemnify a harmed party, usually a 
collector or gallery, acknowledging the economic loss that can occur from an artist 
failing to complete or deliver a work.  This indemnification solution was also used 
in L’Affaire Rouault, where a dealer stored many unfinished works by the French 
painter Georges Henri Rouault.  After the dealer died, Rouault’s heirs argued that 
they owned the works.  The French court held that because Rouault had not yet 
publicly disclosed these works, his heirs still could enforce Rouault’s moral rights if 
they paid back any advances the dealer had provided Roualt.59   The French solution 
does not appear to address the equitable remedy of specific performance.  Even in 
the U.S., however, it is unlikely that an artist could be legally required to create a 
contracted-for work, as distinguished from being required to deliver a completed 
work.  In any event, VARA does not apply to works-for-hire (many commissions 
would fall in this category), and the moral rights that it codifies are waivable. 
B. DROIT À LA PATERNITÉ60 
The French right of attribution is phrased in generally positive terms.  An author 
may require that her name appear alongside her work and related promotional 
materials.  French artists also enjoy the right to prevent a third party from associating 
their name with the artists’ work (i.e., Andy Author could prevent Edward Editor 
from claiming credit for Novel).  The right of attribution is inalienable, and the statute 
only provides authors with a limited ability to renounce it.61 
The text of the French right of attribution notably does not cover an artist 
removing her name from a work of art, disavowing, or unattributing a work that she 
previously admitted to creating.  Under the statute, unlike in the U.S., the right to 
remove one’s name from a work of art is not couched in terms of “attribution.”  
Accordingly, based on a strict statutory reading, Noland could not deny attribution 
of her work under French law. 
In court, however, the French right of attribution is applied similarly to VARA, 
as demonstrated by the 1935 case Valdo-Barbey v. Opera-Comique.62  Mr. Gheusi, 
director of the Opera-Comique, contracted with Mr. Valdo-Barbey to create scenery 
 
 58. See DaSilva, supra note 14, at 18 (citing Tribunal civil de la Seine [CA] [regional court of 
appeal], Paris, 1e civ., Mar. 20, 1895, D.P.2. 465). 
 59. See DaSilva, supra note 14, at 19 (citing Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e 
civ., Mar. 19, 1947, D.P. 20). 
 60. CIP art. L212-1 (“An author shall enjoy the right to respect for his name [and] his 
authorship[.]”).  See also Sirinelli, supra note 8, at 181. 
 61. Sirinelli, supra note 8, at 181; CIP L121-1. 
 62. ALFRED VANOUIS, LETTER FROM FRANCE 9–10 (Gertrude Rosenstein, trans. 1947) (citing 
Court of Paris, 1st ch., Nov. 20, 1935, Valdo-Barbey v. Theatre of the Opera Comique, Gaz. Des Trib., 
issue of Apr. 29–30, 1936, Gaz. du Palais, issue of Jan. 29, 1936). 
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and costumes for a production.  Five years later, Gheusi revived the production and 
on the playbill continued to attribute the scenery and costumes to Valdo-Barbey.  But 
without consulting Valdo-Barbey, Gheusi had substantially altered the scenery and 
costumes.  The court granted Valdo-Barbey’s request that his name no longer be 
associated with the work because the scenery and costumes now employed no longer 
represented his original intention for the production.63  Valdo-Barbey essentially 
invoked his right to disavow the costumes and scenery because he believed Gheusi 
destroyed the integrity of his original work. 
C. DROIT AU RESPECT DE L’OEUVRE64 
Valdo-Barbey, although grounded in the right of attribution, primarily focused on 
Gheusi’s impermissible destruction of both the scenery’s and costumes’ integrity.  
The right of integrity in France is philosophical:  an author may assert the duty of 
others to respect the integrity of her work.65  Prior to the enactment of VARA, John 
Henry Merryman frequently wrote on the French right of integrity to advocate that 
the U.S. adopt moral rights, and often used as an example a case involving the French 
artist Bernard Buffet.  Buffet painted multiple sides of a refrigerator to be auctioned 
as a single work for charity.  Later, Buffet discovered that the work had been 
dismantled and that its panels were being sold separately as his original works.  To 
prevent the sale of individual panels, Buffet sued and convinced a French court that 
the dismantling of a single artistic unit is a violation of an artist’s right of integrity.66  
Buffet presents a straightforward fact pattern in which an artist properly invokes le 
droit au respect de l’oeuvre.  Compare Buffet to an incident that occurred in the U.S. 
twenty years later, but before VARA was enacted. 
In 1982, Isamu Noguchi faced a similar problem to Buffet’s, but had no legal 
recourse.  His enormous sculpture, Shinto, was commissioned for and built in the 
lobby of the New York Bank of Tokyo Trust building in 1975.  Noguchi was paid 
$20,000.  Without permission, the bank removed the site-specific piece and cut it 
into storable-sized pieces several years later.  The bank then donated the pieces of 
Shinto to a museum in Florida.  Noguchi refused to restore the piece (a restored 
Shinto could have been worth as much as $150,000 at that time).  Nevertheless, the 
museum accepted the gift with its reduced value and installed it without Noguchi’s 
help.  Although there was no lawsuit, Noguchi testified at hearings that led to early 
moral rights legislation passed in New York in the years prior to VARA.  As with 
Noland’s Log Cabin, Noguchi considered Shinto to have been destroyed without 
consultation, and his public statements against the work had huge effects on its 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. CIP art. L121-1 (“An author shall enjoy the right to respect for his … work.”); see also Sirinelli, 
supra note 8, at 181. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Refrigerator of Buffet, supra note 29, at 1023 (citing Buffet v. Fersing, Cour d’appel [CA] 
[regional court of appeals] Paris, 1e civ., 1962, S. Jur. 570, 571). 
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market value.67  As Amy Adler notes, however, the right of integrity assumes that 
the living artist has the best knowledge of her own work.68 
D. DROIT DE RETRAIT OU DE REPENTIR 
The “right of withdrawal” or droit de retrait ou de repentir seems to have been 
drafted with literature in mind: 
Notwithstanding assignment of his right of exploitation, the author shall enjoy a right 
to reconsider or of withdrawal, even after publication of his work, with respect to the 
assignee.  However, he may only exercise that right on the condition that he indemnify 
the assignee beforehand for any prejudice the reconsideration or withdrawal may cause 
him.  If the author decides to have his work published after having exercised his right 
to reconsider or of withdrawal, he shall be required to offer his rights of exploitation in 
the first instance to the assignee he originally chose and under the conditions originally 
determined.69 
Pursuant to this provision, Andy Author has the right to withdraw The Great Novel 
from circulation on the condition that he indemnifies Edward Editor against damage 
caused by the decision.  If Andy has a change of heart and wants to republish Novel, 
he must do so with Edward under the terms of their original agreement.  In theory, 
this law would give authors unprecedented control over publication.  But as moral 
rights scholar Russell DaSilva points out, the realities of authors’ abilities to pay such 
indemnifications makes use of le droit de retrait ou de repentir unlikely.  DaSilva 
states of these rights: “both their existence and their application in the courts are 
disputable.  Before 1957, the rights had been discussed by French jurists, but virtually 
never applied in the courts.”70  Merryman, however, notes the “potential utility [of 
Art. L121-4] in connection with works of visual art.” 
DaSilva writes of one instance in which le droit de retrait ou de repentir has been 
considered in connection with a disavowed work of visual art in France.71  An artist 
alleged a painting was a forgery of his work and removed the allegedly fake signature 
from the canvas.  The court held the artist liable for damages under two rationales.  
First, if the painting was indeed a forgery, the artist still had no right to damage 
another person’s property.  Second, if the painting was not a forgery and the artist 
simply wanted to retract his name from the work, without evidence that the work had 
 
 67. Grace Glueck, Art People; Noguchi and ‘Shinto’ Again, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 1982), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/12/arts/art-people-noguchi-and-shinto-again.html; Josh Barbanel, New 
State Law Gives Artists Right to Sue to Protect Work, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 1983), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/08/14/nyregion/new-state-law-gives-artists-right-to-sue-to-protect-
work.html. 
 68. Amy Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 265 (2009).  
 69. CIP art. L121-4; see Refrigerator of Buffet, supra note 29, at 1028.  Withdrawal provisions also 
exist in Italian and in German law.  In Italy, the right of withdrawal is limited to withdrawal from 
“commerce” to protect the reputation of the author when “circulation of the work is found to be seriously 
injurious to his ideals and personal interests.”  See VALERIA FALCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN 
ITALY 50 (2014). 
 70. DaSilva, supra note 14, at 23. 
 71. Refrigerator of Buffet, supra note 29, at 1028. 
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been improperly modified, he was not permitted to exercise his right of withdrawal 
after selling the painting.72  It is clear that even in France where moral rights are well 
established, artists do not have a unilateral withdrawal right for unmodified works 
after they have been sold, and must compensate the owner for damages caused by a 
disavowal. 
VARA states that an artist “shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her 
name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, 
or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or 
reputation.”73  Practically, this might amount to an injunction preventing a collector 
or museum from displaying a disavowed work with an attribution to the artist 
(although enforcement would seem to be difficult on private property).  The law does 
not, however, address the situation in which an artist publicly revokes her name from 
a work that has not been modified to a prejudicial extent.  Under traditional canons 
of statutory interpretation, that would seem to imply there is no such right in the 
U.S. 74   This is further supported by the fact that the U.S. has not historically 
interpreted moral rights broadly in any form, and VARA itself is a very narrowly 
applicable piece of legislation.  Consequently, if an artist disavows for reasons not 
listed under VARA, she should not be permitted to invoke its legal protections. 
The following section explores the details of the Noland cases and how French 
law may provide a solution to this problem currently vexing U.S. courts and the art 
world. 
III. THE NOLAND CASES 
Noland has been involved in a number of lawsuits relating to her disavowal of 
works.  In Jancou v. Sotheby’s, Noland revoked attribution of a work whose 
condition had not been considered by a court.75  Noland was attempting to prevent 
the sale of a work at auction, which resulted in financial injury to the collector.  This 
case calls for a reexamination of VARA and development of a method for 
compensating the collector who may never recoup the difference between the value 
of an acknowledged work and that of a work rejected by its author.   The cases of 
Mueller v. Janssen and the recently filed Noland v. Janssen present more complex, 
even philosophical issues.  What is the role of “authenticity” in conceptual art?  To 
what extent can a work be conserved before it is no longer “original”?  Such 
questions are no longer relegated to the field of art history, but implicate law and 
economics as well.   
 
 72. See id. at 25 (citing Cour d’Appel [CA] [regional court of appeals] Paris, Apr. 19, 1961, Gaz. 
Pal. 2.218). 
 73. § 106A(a)(2). 
 74. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://perma.cc/CZV8-ZFQF (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2017) (“[A] principle in statutory construction: when one or more things of a class are 
expressly mentioned others of the same class are excluded[.]” 
 75. Marc Jancou Fine Art v. Sotheby’s Inc., No. 650316-2012, 2012 WL 7964120 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Nov. 13, 2012). 
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A. JANCOU V. SOTHEBY’S 
In September 2011, the New York gallery Marc Jancou Contemporary (“Jancou”) 
consigned Noland’s 1990 aluminum print, Cowboys Milking, to Sotheby’s.76  The 
work, with an estimated value between $250,000 and $350,000, was featured 
prominently in Sotheby’s November 2011 auction catalogue. 77   Employing a 
common industry practice, Sotheby’s publicly displayed Cowboys Milking prior to 
the auction, which provided Noland and her attorney an opportunity to view the work 
in person.  After visiting Sotheby’s and seeing the work, Noland objected to the 
inclusion of Cowboys Milking in the upcoming auction and invoked her “statutory 
right” under VARA to disclaim authorship of the work, demanding it be 
withdrawn.78  “Noland’s declaration abruptly propelled the object from high-value 
work of art to … some sort of eternal limbo.”79 
Noland argued the condition of Cowboys Milking materially differed from when 
it was created.80  Prior to consignment, Jancou’s conservator reported the work was 
in good condition, except for slight deformations on its corners that he was unable to 
correct.  When Cowboys Milking arrived at Sotheby’s, the auction house noted:  
“[s]ome bending of the aluminum at 3 of the corners [and] there are some small areas 
of bending/indentation in the aluminum; ex: along the left side near the upper corner, 
and also along the bottom edge near center.”81  Sotheby’s was allegedly unaware of 
prior conservation before they accepted the work from Jancou, and would later claim 
the damage was done by Jancou’s conservator.  While the record does not clearly 
account for how these deformations occurred, Cowboys Milking had been transported 
between New York, Chicago, and Cologne since 1990.  Some minimal amount of 
wear is to be expected upon such a widely travelled piece.  Neither Jancou’s 
conservator nor Sotheby’s concluded that the minor damage warranted concern. 
After unsuccessfully trying to dissuade Noland from her disavowal, Sotheby’s 
withdrew Cowboys Milking shortly before the auction.82  Sotheby’s initiated no legal 
challenge to Noland’s VARA claim, even though the modifications in question 
arguably do not appear to have been the result of intentional destruction or negligent 
handling, but rather “the passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials.”83 
Jancou sued Sotheby’s and Noland in New York state court for breach of contract 
and fiduciary duty and tortious interference, respectively.  The court dismissed both 
of Jancou’s claims on summary judgment, and an appellate court affirmed.  The New 
 
 76. Complaint at Exhibit A, Jancou (No. 650316-2012).  The consignment agreement indicates 
Cowboys Milking was estimated to sell for, at a minimum, $150,000 more than Jancou originally paid. 
 77. Affirmation of Charles G. Moerdler, Exhibit 2, Jancou (No. 650316-2012). 
 78. Answer to Amended Complaint at 7, Jancou (No. 650316-2012). 
 79. Martha Buskirk, Marc Jancou, Cady Noland, and the Case of the Authorless Artwork, 
HYPERALLERGIC (Dec. 9, 2013), https://perma.cc/YEU4-5GC7. 
 80. Answer to the Amended Complaint at 2, Jancou (No. 650316-2012). 
 81. Jancou, slip op. at 2.  Christie’s allegedly declined to auction Cowboys Milking because of 
questions about its condition.  But the complaint contains no allegations that either the conservator or 
Sotheby’s was grossly negligent.  Complaint, Jancou (No. 650316-2012). 
 82. Jancou, slip op. at 2–4. 
 83. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1)–(2). 
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York Supreme Court asserted that determination of Jancou did not require the court 
to interpret VARA.  Instead, the court concluded that the issue was “whether, in the 
face of the artist’s objection under VARA to the use of her name as the author of the 
print, there is any material issue of fact as to whether Sotheby’s failed to comply with 
its contractual and fiduciary obligations to plaintiff.” 84   Per the consignment 
agreement between Jancou and Sotheby’s, the auction house maintained the right to 
“withdraw any Property at any time before sale if in [its] sole judgment (a) there is 
doubt as to [the Property’s] authenticity or attribution.”85   Noland’s disavowal 
permitted Sotheby’s to claim “doubt as to the authenticity or attribution” of Cowboys 
Milking as the basis for withdrawing the work.  John Cahill, a well-known New York 
art lawyer, argues that Jancou shows how VARA’s statutory ambiguities allow 
auction houses to withdraw controversial works without repercussion.86 
Jancou still owns Cowboys Milking, but it is unlikely the print can be sold as a 
“Cady Noland.”87  Adler assessed the consequences of Jancou:  “We don’t know 
whether the damage rises to [destruction] and whether this artwork is no longer a 
Cady Noland or if it is merely a Cady Noland that was diminished in value.”88  In its 
current form, VARA is simply ill-equipped to govern the complexities posed by 
challenges to the primacy of authorship.  In Against Moral Rights, Adler argues 
VARA is based on an antiquated definition of art and asks:  “Does the artist know 
what’s best for his art?  Is he the right person to entrust with the enforcement of moral 
rights?  Should his intent govern the ‘meaning’ of the piece?”89  Adler’s thoughtful 
inquiry also leads to additional questions such as whether an artist should be able to 
object if a well-known contemporary art gallerist, conservator, and auction house 
collectively believe that a work of art is in good condition, and whether a party could 
stop an artist from objecting to such a belief.  There are also monetary considerations.  
Under moral rights regimes, art is given an elevated status that may conflict with its 
presence in an economic market.  Sonya G. Bonneau acknowledges the contradiction 
inherent to VARA, which “both denies the economic side of art and attempts to 
redress it.”90 
In the end, Jancou lost not only the potential profit from a sale of Cowboys Milking 
through the 2011 Sotheby’s auction, but likewise a portion of the (if not the full) 
value of the work as an asset for future sale.  VARA provides no solution to this 
problem, and Jancou has not taken the step of suing Noland for an improper 
invocation of the law.  Even if Jancou were to gain a successful court ruling that the 
work was an “original” Noland, the value of the work would likely still be 
diminished.  In such situations, were there an indemnification provision in VARA, 
artists would have to think more carefully before publicly expressing concerns about 
 
 84. Jancou, slip op. at 3. 
 85. Id.  
 86. See Tracy Zwick, Sotheby’s and Jancou Battle in Appeals Court over Cady Noland Artwork, 
ART IN AMERICA (June 7, 2013), https://perma.cc/P6VQ-P7KM. 
 87. See Buskirk, supra note 79. 
 88. See Zwick, supra note 86. 
 89. See Adler, supra note 37, at 271. 
 90. Bonneau, supra note 1, at 95. 
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a work of art for fear of being liable for the market value.  Even if VARA contained 
such a provision, however, if settlement of a dispute could not be established through 
negotiation, litigation costs could pose a barrier to enforcement of either party’s 
rights:  on one hand, the art in question would need to be valuable enough to make 
litigation worthwhile for the owner, and on the other, many artists lack the financial 
resources to challenge attribution in court.  
B. MUELLER V. JANSSEN GALLERY 
Like Cowboys Milking, the subject of the second legal dispute involving Noland 
was also produced in 1990.  This work, Log Cabin, is a wooden façade on which 
American flags have been superimposed, fabricated to Noland’s design and 
specifications.91  In 1990, Log Cabin was first exhibited at and sold by Galerie Max 
Hetzler to German collector Wilhem Schurmann on November 15 of that year.92  
From 1992 to 2005, Log Cabin was on loan to German museums, the last of which 
exhibited the work outdoors for a decade.  During this period, Log Cabin “suffered 
significant damage and deterioration due to its material composition, the inherent 
nature of its wood and other physical components, and the effects of weather, 
seasonal changes in climate, time, and other natural elements.”93  Noland allegedly 
approved of displaying the work outside and treating the wood to protect it.94  In 
2010, a condition report indicated that “the only way to ensure the long-term 
viability/existence of the artwork would be to replace the rotting logs with new 
ones.”95  Thus, Log Cabin was reconstructed according to Noland’s original plans.  
The restored work was included in the 2011 exhibition “Cady Noland / Santiago 
Sierra” at KOW Berlin.  At the time, Noland requested an image of Log Cabin be 
removed from KOW’s website because she objected to her work being shown in 
context with Sierra, but evidently did not know about the conservation at that point.96  
In 2014, Shurmann sold Log Cabin to prominent Cleveland art patron Scott C. 
Mueller for $1.4 million.  The lawsuit surrounding this transaction involved several 
parties:  Marisa Newman, Brett Shaheen, and Galerie Michael Janssen (“Janssen”).  
Marisa Newman, through her eponymous New York art advisory, brought Log Cabin 
to the attention of Brett Shaheen, an Ohio art dealer who advised Mueller.  
Eventually, Schurmann sold Log Cabin to Mueller through Janssen, a Berlin-based 
gallery.  Because of Jancou, Newman and her attorney advised Mueller to include a 
buy-back provision in his contract with Janssen in the event Noland “affirmatively 
 
 91. Complaint, Exhibit A at 10, Mueller v. Michael Janssen Gallery Pte. Ltd., 225 F. Supp. 3d 201 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016).  In this way, Log Cabin is a conceptual work of art.  See generally, Tate, Conceptual 
Art (last visited Feb. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/VW8C-4WK4.  Conceptual art was a movement that 
emerged in the 1960s and takes many forms, but is unified by the ideological underpinning that the idea 
behind the work of art is more important than the finished, physical product. 
 92. Marber & Sharon Flescher, Conserved or Copied? Artist Cady Noland at It Again Over Log 
Cabin, 18:2–3 IFAR J. 6–8 (2017). 
 93. Complaint, Exhibit A at 11, Mueller, 225 F. Supp. 3d 201 (No. 1:15-CV-04827). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 10. 
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refuses to acknowledge or approve the legitimacy of the work; seeks to disassociate 
her name from the work; or claims that her moral rights . . . have been violated.”97  
In his complaint, Mueller alleges that Newman “provided guidance that this [possible 
event] was an unlikely concern” and represented that Noland had approved all 
auctioned works “except the Jancou work.”98  Further, in direct response to the 
question of whether Noland could challenge Log Cabin under VARA, Newman 
responded:  “considering the fact that the re-fabrication was based on [Noland’s] 
original blue print, it is hard to imagine how they could prejudice her honor or 
reputation (a type of prejudice represented to invoke an artist’s rights under 
VARA).”99  Likewise, Newman annotated a photograph of Log Cabin with the 
phrase:  “exactly the same nothing to argue about.” 100   The agreement also 
represented Janssen and Schurmann had sufficient capital to pay expenses in the 
event that the buy-back clause was triggered.101  Pursuant to the agreement, Mueller 
wired the full amount of money to Janssen.  Before Log Cabin was shipped to the 
United States, Shaheen (with Janssen’s permission) informed Noland of the 
conservation that had occurred.  Noland promptly called Shaheen to tell him “that 
any effort to display or sell the sculpture must include notice that the piece was 
remade without the artist’s consent, that it now consists of unoriginal materials, and 
that she does not approve of the work.”102 
The story of Log Cabin was further complicated when Janssen failed to return the 
full purchase price to Mueller.  In 2015, with Log Cabin still in Schurmann’s German 
storage facilities, Mueller sued in the Southern District of New York.  In his 
complaint, Mueller claimed breach of contract against Janssen, unjust enrichment 
against Shurmann, and breach of fiduciary duty as well as unjust enrichment against 
Newman.  Additionally, Mueller brought an individual claim against the owner of 
Galerie Michael Janssen for conversion.103  Although claims against Shurmann and 
Newman have been dismissed, the case against Janssen remains pending.104 
Noland initiated her own lawsuit in July 2017, seeking damages and injunctive 
relief against Janssen, KOW, and their art advisor, Chris D’Amelio.  She alleges 
negligence on the part of owners of Log Cabin for allowing it to deteriorate to the 
point it required drastic conservation and discarding of the original materials.  
Further, Noland claims Log Cabin as it currently exists is an unauthorized replica of 
her work with which the defendants are associating her name.  She is thus invoking 
both the integrity and attribution provisions of VARA.  Noland seeks impoundment 
of the “fake” Log Cabin and all images of it currently in defendants’ possession, or 
proof of its destruction by defendants, and damages of up to $150,000 if a court finds 
willful infringement.  The parties, courts, and reporters seem to have overlooked one 
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 99. Id. at 9–10. 
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crucial fact in the Log Cabin dispute.  VARA was enacted in 1990, but did not 
become effective until June 1, 1991.105  Works transferred prior to that effective date 
are not protected by VARA—thus, Log Cabin is not even covered by the statute and 
Noland’s case should be dismissed on statutory grounds.106 
Nevertheless, Noland’s suit opens a cascade of questions of fact and theory.  Is 
Log Cabin as it currently exists a conserved original or an unauthorized replica?  And 
if it is considered conserved, was the conservation negligent?  Defendants allege the 
work was both initially constructed and then conserved according to Noland’s 
specifications by the same company.  If this is true, and the structure was never 
“original” to Noland’s hand, was reconstruction according to her plans improper?  If 
you replace all of the planks in a boat one by one, is it the same boat?  Since the 
Renaissance, master-artists have employed studio assistants while presenting 
finished works under only the master’s name.  Andy Warhol revolutionized the 
modern notion of authorship by directing others to create his works with traditionally 
commercial techniques in “The Factory.”  The same year Noland began disavowing 
art, the Warhol Foundation ceased authenticating works because it was too difficult 
to distinguish whose hands created a “Warhol,” a task made more demanding by the 
immense amounts of money at stake.107  Contemporaries of Noland, such as Jeff 
Koons, use industrial fabricators to create their art.  If an artist can claim authorship 
of a work she did not physically create, can she likewise deny authorship if the work 
was remade again? 
These questions are emerging more frequently as conceptual works of art 
deteriorate.  Dan Flavin, for example, became famous in the 1960s for his 
installations using common fluorescent lights of varying colors.  Over time, the exact 
lights Flavin used were discontinued.  During his lifetime, Flavin provided 
contradictory solutions to the conservation of his works.  He said the works would 
expire when the lights did, but also worked with museums to replicate the original 
lights towards the end of his lifetime.  Does this mean that once a Flavin expires, a 
collector or museum has lost the value of the work?  Is replicating the lights 
producing an unauthorized copy?  The fact that Noland is still alive and actively 
debating these questions allows us insight into an artist’s choices, but, as Adler asks, 
should the artist’s desires supersede all else?108 
 
 105. “The rights created by section 106A of title 17, United States Code, shall apply to—(1) works 
created before the effective date set forth in subsection (a) but title to which has not, as of such effective 
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of such title) of any work which occurred before such effective date.”  Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. 101–650, § 610, 104 Stat. 513. 
 106. Marber & Flescher, supra note 92.  In the cases of Jancou and Mueller, where Noland did not 
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claims.  Marc Jancou Fine Art, Ltd. v. Sotheby’s Inc., No. 650316-2012, slip op. at 2, 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Nov. 13, 2012); Mueller v. Michael Janssen Gallery PTE., Ltd., 225 F. Supp. 3d 201, 204 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 
2, 2016). 
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MARBER, AN INDEMNIFICATION SOLUTION TO UNMERITED VARA CLAIMS, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 319 (2018) 
338 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [41:2 
France has a clear stance on the matter:  the artist’s opinion is primary and 
supersedes even contractual agreements.  From the U.S. perspective, the answer is 
less clear.  What constitutes negligent conservation?  When is the integrity of a 
conceptual work of art compromised?  These are the questions posed by Cady 
Noland, and they are not purely theoretical:  legal disputes have already cost 
collectors, galleries, and auction houses hundreds of thousands of dollars.109  The 
outcome of the Noland series of disputes, if not settled, will be one of the few 
opportunities for courts to work out these issues.  As Merryman wrote, “The history 
of artists’ rights has yet to be written.”110 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Cady Noland is an artist of recognized stature whose works garner high prices at 
auction and whose words about her own work hold great sway in the artistic 
community.  By invoking VARA through disavowals of works arguably altered only 
through conservation, Noland renders collectors unable to sell her disavowed works, 
as evidenced by Sotheby’s withdrawal of Cowboys Milking from auction and the 
cancelled sale of Log Cabin.  Even if these collectors were to challenge the 
invocation of VARA and request that a court enjoin Noland to authenticate the 
works, buyers might still question their “authenticity” or only be willing to pay a 
reduced price.  Thus, Noland has lowered the value of another person’s property—
potentially without cause.  In exploring these issues in the context of both French and 
United States law, this Note proposes an indemnification solution based on 
prevailing market prices if a court determines that an artist improperly invoked 
VARA—for example, describing standard conservation or normal, minor wear and 
tear as “mutilation.”  This indemnification solution would serve to dissuade artists 
from misusing the law, and potentially remedy the harm done to market participants.  
Some might argue that this further disenfranchises the artist who already has little 
legal protection, but such measures would likely only be warranted in the relatively 
rare situations where works of living artists are of a sufficient value to warrant 
litigation. 
Appropriation artist Richard Prince is already employing this indemnification 
strategy extralegally.  In 2014, Prince created a New Portrait based on an Instagram 
photograph of Ivanka Trump having her hair and makeup done and sold the painting 
to the Trump family for $36,000.  After the election of Donald Trump, Prince 
returned payment for the Ivanka portrait and tweeted:  “This is not my work. I did 
not make it.  I deny.  I denounce.  This is fake art.”111  Art critic Jerry Saltz has 
speculated, “perhaps all the living artists in the Kushner-Trump collection might 
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disown their work, say it is ‘fake,’ making it instantly worthless.” 112   First 
Amendment issues aside, political objections to a collector are certainly not statutory 
grounds for disavowal under VARA.  And even though Prince may consider any 
association with Trump prejudicial to his reputation, he did not allege the work had 
been modified as VARA requires.  Nevertheless, Prince essentially indemnified the 
Trump family for the potential loss in value his disavowal could have on the painting.  
The Prince situation may serve as an example for future disputes, where the 
indemnification solution could be utilized.  However, there is lively debate about 
how Prince’s disavowal will affect the art market and how it relates to VARA.113  
Many commentators speculate that Prince’s actions will actually raise the value of 
the work, rather than render it unsaleable on the secondary market as Noland’s 
disavowals did.114 
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